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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the extent to which tax and benefit policy changes introduced in the period 
2001-11 had a poverty- or inequality-reducing effect. We assess whether the period was indeed a 
“missed opportunity” for policy changes to make a difference to poverty reduction since the Lisbon 
Treaty, given the general lack of improvement shown by poverty indicators. Our analysis uses the 
tax-benefit model EUROMOD and covers seven diverse EU countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy and the United Kingdom. We apply the Bargain and Callan (2010) 
decomposition approach, extending it by separating the effect due to structural policy changes and 
the indexation effect. We find that the latter was typically more effective in alleviating poverty and 
inequality than changes to the structure of policies. In fact, most of the structural changes that 
governments introduced, especially in the 2007-11 crisis-onset period, had poverty and inequality-
increasing effects. We find considerable variation between countries in how different policy 
instruments have been adjusted, and in the effects of these adjustments by income, by age and by 
household composition, showing the importance of understanding them together, rather than 
discussing just some in isolation.  
 
JEL: D31, H23, H53, I32 
 
Keywords: tax-benefit policies, European Union, income distribution, income poverty, 
microsimulation. 
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1 Introduction 
A wide range of factors influence poverty and the overall income distribution. Many of these, such as 
demographic change or the distribution of work across households, are not under the direct control 
of policy makers or amenable to short-term public policy intervention, although of course active 
labour market policy and in-work benefits aimed at making work pay do have influences on labour 
market behaviour (Cantillon and Vandenbroucke, 2014: 321). In assessing the performance of 
government policy in terms of (income) poverty or inequality reduction it is important to isolate the 
impact of the most relevant factors that policy makers are able to control. In this paper we assess 
how changes to the structure and generosity of the system of cash income protection and the 
structure and parameters of direct personal taxes and social contributions over the period 2001-11 
have had an impact on poverty and income inequality.  
This period is particularly salient because, at its starting point, the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 set about 
achieving sustainable economic growth and increased social cohesion in the EU by 2010. There was a 
particular emphasis on reducing poverty and social exclusion and the Open Method of Coordination 
was established to improve national policy making towards this common goal (Cantillon and 
Vandenbroucke, 2014). However, what is known about the period since the early 2000s shows a 
mixed experience across EU countries in terms of changes to the risk of poverty rate and levels of 
income inequality.1 The hoped for comprehensive “decisive impact on the eradication of poverty” 
(European Council, 2000) has not occurred and poverty and inequality levels in some countries have 
risen, not fallen. The explanations for this are many and various (Nolan et al., 2014). One common 
factor is the Great Recession in the second half of the period we consider. This paper addresses the 
question whether policy changes made by EU Member State governments in the period since Lisbon 
did in fact have a poverty-reducing effect, even if other factors were pushing in the other direction 
and the overall results were disappointing. In addition, it considers separately the pre-crisis period 
and that including its onset. To our knowledge, there is no comparative study that looks at the effect 
of policy changes in EU countries over this period, which allows an exploration of the changes to the 
welfare state contrasting those introduced during a period of economic growth with those made 
during economic recession.  
A study for an earlier period, 1998-2001, by Bargain and Callan (2010) estimated the effects of tax-
benefit policy changes on income distribution for the EU-15 countries. Among more recent cross-
country evidence is the study by Avram et al. (2013) that assesses distributional effects of fiscal 
consolidation measures in 2008-2012 in nine EU countries. However, the focus of the study is mainly 
on austerity measures rather than all policy reforms in that period. Jenkins et al. (2013) present 
seven country case studies which examine changes in the income distribution at the beginning of the 
Great Recession, shedding light on changes in factors such as hours worked, the employment rate, 
GDP, poverty and inequality, but saying little about the role of tax-benefit policies in changing the 
income distribution. Bargain et al. (2013a) focus specifically on the period 2008-2010 and conclude 
that policies in that period helped to stabilise (or even decrease) inequality and poverty (measured 
                                                          
1
 For the period since the mid 2000s see the Eurostat database for indicators based on EU-SILC: At-risk-of-
poverty rate by poverty threshold, age and sex (indicator: ilc_li02) and Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable 
income (ilc_di12). Prior to this there are no comparable sources of income distribution data. Appendix 1 
summarises the available estimates for the countries covered in this paper. See Tóth (2014) for a state-of-the 
art synthesis of knowledge about the evolution of income inequality in EU and OECD countries up to 2010.  
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against a floating relative poverty line) in three out of four EU countries considered (France, 
Germany, the UK and Ireland).2  
This paper assesses how the changes in taxes (direct taxes and social insurance contributions) and 
transfers (social security benefits and public pensions) in the 2000s affected the evolution of poverty 
and inequality, and the overall income distribution in selected EU countries. Many things – not least 
the initial period of growth and then the effects of the crisis itself – affected incomes and 
employment, and hence inequality and poverty, over this decade. But our aim is to abstract from 
these wider (and in some cases, very large) economic changes, and those arising from demographic 
and other population changes, and to focus on the direct redistributive effects of policy. Overall, our 
analysis should help to understand the different routes taken by countries since the Lisbon Treaty, 
and why in a period of growth, progress in poverty reduction was often disappointing, but also how 
some countries have been able to counter increases in poverty (on some definitions) since the onset 
of the crisis. In turn, these experiences may provide some lessons that suggest the relative 
importance of different instruments in their potential contribution (helpful or otherwise) to achieving 
the European Union’s ambitions for poverty reduction by 2020. 
We estimate the effect of policy changes on income distribution using microsimulation techniques, 
following the decomposition framework formalised in Bargain and Callan (2010) and also applied in 
Bargain (2012, 2012) and Bargain et al. (2013a, 2013b). The decomposition method separates the 
(direct) policy effect from other effects, i.e. changes in population characteristics such as the 
employment rate, fertility and household structure. We apply this method using the tax-benefit 
microsimulation model EUROMOD to seven EU countries in 2001-2011. The countries that we cover 
are Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy and the UK, which not only vary in the size and 
the type of welfare state but have also experienced very different kinds of economic change and 
policy reforms in the period considered.3 We consider separately the period before the economic 
crisis (2001-07) and the years covering its start (2007-11), simulating the effects of the policy systems 
that each country had in place in 2001, 2007 and 2011 on a fixed population, with the characteristics 
and distribution of market incomes as they were in 2007.4 We look in detail at the separate 
components of tax and transfer systems and at how they changed over the decade. This allows us to 
say not only whether policy changes as a whole tended to reduce or increase poverty or inequality, 
but also to identify which parts of the systems contributed to that.  
In comparing policy systems from different points in time, decisions must be made about the 
adjustment of monetary levels of policy parameters (e.g. benefit payments or tax thresholds) to 
allow for changes in prices and incomes. We discuss the issue of how to index the counterfactual 
                                                          
2
 In addition, there are individual country studies including a long-standing body of literature focusing on the 
redistributive effect of tax-benefit policies in the UK context (see Clark and Leicester 2004, Sefton et al. 2009, 
Adam and Browne 2010 and Brewer and Wren-Lewis 2012). 
3
 Examples of policy reforms in this period are the replacement of progressive income taxation with a flat 
income tax in Bulgaria and Hungary; introduction of contributory maternity and unemployment benefits in 
Estonia, the complete revision of the income tax schedules in Greece, the reforms to in-work benefits and tax 
credits in the UK and to income tax and family allowances in Italy. This list is for illustration only and is by no 
means comprehensive. 
4
 It must be stressed here that the effect of policy changes is conditional on population characteristics and 
market incomes and thus, the analysis could yield different results if the population sample were different. This 
point is further explained in section 2.  
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policy systems and make use of three alternative options in our analysis, each with their distinct 
interpretations.  
Our paper extends the literature in several ways. We extend the decomposition framework of 
Bargain and Callan (2010) by distinguishing between structural policy changes and indexation effects. 
We define structural changes as changes in the design of the tax-benefit system (e.g. introduction of 
a new benefit, change in the tax regime or social insurance contribution rate), which are usually 
presented explicitly as policy reforms, and indexation effects as changes to the policy parameters 
with monetary values (e.g. benefit amounts and tax thresholds), which are often less visible.5 The 
indexation effect is derived from a comparison with a counterfactual based on a standardised 
indexation assumption and provides us with a measure of the effect of fiscal drag and benefit 
erosion. To our knowledge, this is the first paper measuring actual fiscal drag and benefit erosion for 
tax-benefit systems as a whole, while previous studies, e.g. Immervoll (2005), Immervoll et al. (2006) 
and Sutherland et al. (2008), have assessed it for the special case where policies are assumed to 
remain constant or adjusted only according to statutory rules (while incomes or prices increase).  
We provide the empirical evidence on the effects of tax-benefit policy changes on the income 
distribution for a variety of EU countries over a time period covering an episode of growth as well as 
a period of economic crisis. We find that the effect of policy changes on both poverty and inequality 
often depends on the choice of counterfactual indexation against which policies are assessed, and on 
whether the poverty line is anchored to a fixed level of income (as under the 2007 system) or 
allowed to float with changes in income levels due to policy changes. Nevertheless, our robust 
findings are that compared to the 2001 system, the 2011 policy system is more effective in reducing 
the risk of poverty in Belgium, Estonia and the UK. However, policy changes have clearly resulted in 
increased poverty against an anchored line in Greece and against a floating line in Hungary. 
Irrespective of the indexation comparison, policy reforms contributed to income inequality reduction 
in Estonia and the UK both before and after 2007, but in the other countries the results vary by time 
period and the specific comparative system used. 
Exploring the nature of the reforms, we find that – aside from structural changes – benefit amounts 
and tax thresholds were mostly increased by more than growth in prices and, during the crisis, also 
stayed ahead of growth in average market incomes (as it lagged behind price increases). Hence, the 
‘indexation effect’ was typically more effective in alleviating poverty and inequality than changes to 
the structure of policies. In fact, most of the structural changes that governments introduced, 
especially in the 2007-11 crisis-onset period, had a poverty and inequality-increasing effect.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the decomposition approach, building on 
Bargain and Callan (2010). Section 3 discusses the counterfactual indexation against which changes in 
the policy parameters are assessed. Section 4 explains the tax-benefit microsimulation model 
EUROMOD and the data used in the analysis. In section 5, we present our findings for poverty and 
inequality and detailed results on changes in the income distribution and in disposable income for 
different socio-economic groups, including by age. Section 6 concludes.  
                                                          
5
 These are distinct from non-monetary parameters such as percentage rates (e.g. income tax rates). Note also 
that we are not referring to (macro-level) monetary policies. On the other hand, structural changes could also 
involve changes in monetary parameters. However, they are to be distinguished from indexation effects if the 
change is not related to statutory or discretionary indexation, or if the government planned not only change in 
the amounts but effectively a change in the tax-benefit rules. For examples of structural changes and 
indexation effects, see Appendix 2.  
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2 Decomposition method 
We use the decomposition approach which relies on counterfactual scenarios obtained with 
microsimulation techniques, and formalised by Bargain and Callan (2010) – BC hereafter. This 
method decomposes changes in the income distribution into (direct) policy, other and nominal 
effects, and we extend it further by decomposing the policy effect into structural change and 
indexation effect.6 This allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of the policy changes 
governments have undertaken. 
Following the BC notation, we define y a matrix which contains information on market incomes and 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the households, and        a function that 
derives disposable incomes on the basis of  , distinguishing between the structure of the tax-benefit 
system ( ) and policy parameters with monetary values ( ). Let us also define   as a summary 
indicator for a part or the whole distribution of disposable income. This could be for example, 
average income for a specific group of households, an income inequality or a poverty measure.  
The overall change in the distribution of disposable income between two periods (0 and 1) is7  
                              (1) 
This can be decomposed into the policy effect, other effect and nominal effect, by introducing 
counterfactual income distributions8 where attributes (     ) in one period are replaced 
sequentially with those from another period, one at the time. The counterfactuals also involve 
indexing incomes and monetary parameters (denoted with α) so that nominal units would be 
comparable over time. The choice of counterfactual indexation is important and we discuss it in 
detail in section 3. The policy effect shows the direct impact of tax-benefit policy changes (      
     ) on the income distribution. The other effect is the impact on the income distribution from 
changes in market incomes and the characteristics of the population (     ), such as employment, 
age, schooling or returns to schooling. Importantly, the policy effect is assessed conditional on the 
population characteristics either in period 0 or 1, and the other effect conditional on the tax-benefit 
system in period 0 or 1. Hence there is no unique decomposition sequence and instead multiple 
combinations exist. Decomposing the total change in the following way allows to assess the policy 
effect conditional on end-period market income and population, i.e.   : 
                                                          
6
 There is a well-established strand in the economic literature which focuses on decomposing the distribution 
of individual earnings, e.g. Juhn et al. (1993), DiNardo et al. (1996), Lemieux (2002), Fields (2003), Yun (2006), 
see Fortin et al. (2011) for an overview. However, this strand overlooks the role of taxation and ignores other 
income components. Bourguignon et al. (2008) take a step further by looking at household level income which 
includes market incomes, private transfers and retirement income but still excludes taxes and non-retirement 
benefits. The classical source decomposition of income inequality by Shorrocks (1982) accounts for all income 
components; but does not allow the effects due to policy changes to be distinguished from effects due to 
market income changes, or decomposing incomes in nominal terms.  
7
 The same formula can be applied on other income concepts, e.g. means-tested and non means-tested benefit 
income, income from pensions, tax or social insurance liabilities, to show the policy effect by income types (as 
is done in Section 5).  
8
 It is important to note that the counterfactual distributions have only a statistical interpretation and do not 
have any economic meaning, as we have not estimated any behavioural responses to changes in the attributes. 
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                              ⏟  
Policy effect conditional on data 1
                             ⏟   
 ther effect               
                 
                            ⏟    
              
                     
 
(2) 
While the next approach quantifies the policy effect conditional on start-period market income and 
population, i.e.    9 
 
                 [  (
 
 
   
 
 
  )]⏟                  
 ominal effect
                     
  [  (
 
 
   
 
 
  )]   [  (
 
 
     )]⏟                   
 ther effect
                               
  [  (
 
 
     )]              ⏟                   
Policy effect conditional on data 0
 
(3) 
As can be seen in equation (2) and (3), the direct policy effect is obtained by keeping market incomes 
and population characteristics constant and altering the tax-benefit rules and the policy parameters 
with monetary values. The other effect is derived by applying the same policies on the populations in 
periods 1 and 0. In all cases, incomes and monetary parameters are adjusted with a factor   to 
account for differences in nominal levels over in time, which is captured with the nominal effect. 10  
A comprehensive approach would involve the assessment of all combinations11 but also requires 
information on household characteristics before and after the policy change. While there is no 
comparable household information available both for the beginning and the end of the period of 
interest, we can still assess the policy effect – our key interest – in absolute terms though not in 
relative terms (i.e. how much it contributes to the total change) with household information 
available for a single point in time, conditional on that state. However, it is not possible to 
decompose the effect of changes in population characteristics in such a case. 
We extend the decomposition framework by separating the policy effect to distinguish between the 
effect of changes to the monetary parameters (indexation effect) and to the tax-benefit rules 
(structural change). The indexation effect measures how governments have adjusted monetary 
parameters as a whole relative to e.g. changes in incomes or price levels, hence capturing changes in 
effective tax burden (i.e. fiscal drag) and relative value of benefits (i.e. benefit erosion). Note that as 
such we measure fiscal drag and benefit erosion which has actually occurred, while previous 
literature, e.g. Immervoll (2005), Immervoll et al. (2006) and Sutherland et al. (2008), has focused on 
a (hypothetical) scenario where policies are kept constant or adjusted only according to statutory 
rules. Structural change measures the effect of systemic changes, both substantial reforms such as 
the introduction of new benefits or taxes (or abolishing existing ones) as well as fine-tuning the 
existing design by altering particular non-monetary parameters (e.g. tax rate, benefit withdrawal 
                                                          
9
 Note that this is different from the second combination used in BC and emphasises the range of possibilities. 
We have chosen these particular combinations to facilitate the comparison of effects in two periods and 
overall. 
10
 In case      refers to a scale-invariant measure, such as commonly used Gini coefficient or a relative poverty 
concept, the nominal effect is typically close to zero. This is because tax-benefits systems are usually 
homogenous of degree one, i.e.                , as BC demonstrated for France and Ireland. The nominal 
effect does not collapse for absolute measures such as change in the average income. 
11
 BC assess and summarise various combinations by employing the Shorrocks-Shapley approach, which 
effectively means calculating the average effect for a given component across combinations. 
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rate). Distinguishing between these effects allows therefore quantifying two types of government 
action with distinct aims, which might either counterbalance or reinforce each other.  
To achieve this, we rewrite the policy effect component in equation (2) as  
                           ⏟  
 ndexation effect conditional on
                    
                            ⏟   
Structural change conditional on
                     
  (4) 
and in equation (3) as 
 
 [  (
 
 
     )]              ⏟                   
 ndexation effect conditional on
                    
                          ⏟   
Structural change conditional on 
monetary parameters 0
 
(5) 
In the first case, we keep the tax-benefit rules,  , as of period 1 but apply in turn the monetary 
parameters from the two periods. In the second case, the monetary parameters,  , are as of period 
0, and we alter the tax-benefit rules.12 (Alternatively, we could split the structural change first and 
then the indexation effect.) An important thing to notice is that by construction, the choice of 
indexation factor   affects primarily the indexation effect (where it enters one of the terms), and 
only affects the structural change marginally (equation 4) or not at all (equation 5).  
We can now summarise how these equations are applied to measure the (direct) policy effect in the 
period of interest (2001-11) as well as in two sub-periods, the period before the economic crisis 
(2001-07) and the years covering its start (2007-11). We have information available on the 
population characteristics and the distribution of market incomes in 2007 (see Section 4), i.e.    , 
but not in 2001 or 2011. Hence, we measure the policy effect in 2001-07 with equation (2) and the 
policy effect in 2007-11 with equation (3), i.e. both conditional on    . The advantage of measuring 
the effect in two periods in the same units is that it allows combining them easily to obtain the total 
policy effect in 2001-11: 
 
 [   (
 
      
       )]                        
  [   (
 
      
       )]                 
⏟                       
Policy effect in 2007 11 (see e .  )
                                       ⏟
Policy effect in 2001 07 (see e . 2)
 
(6) 
where       and        are the counterfactual indices for the period 2007-11 and 2001-07, 
respectively, and counterfactual disposable income distributions (d) are obtained with 
microsimulation techniques (see section 4). The policy effect in 2001-07 is decomposed further 
(using equation 4)13 
                                     ⏟  
 ndexation effect
                                              ⏟
Structural change
 
                                                          
12
 Note that the additional counterfactuals combine the structure and the monetary parameters from different 
systems. This can be challenging as structural policy changes introduce new monetary parameters or eliminate 
existing ones. This can be overcome by extending a given set of monetary parameters with those existing only 
in the other set. See Appendix 2 for examples. 
13
 To be able to understand government actions and distinguish between structural reforms and simply 
adjustments to the values of benefit amounts and tax thresholds, we consulted with national experts from the 
countries considered in our analysis.  
 A lost decade? Decomposing the effect of 2001-11 tax-benefit policy changes on the income distribution in EU countries 9 
and the policy effect in 2007-11 (using equation 5)14 
 [   (
 
      
       )]                 
⏟                       
 ndexation effect
                                ⏟
Structural change
 
When interpreting the results in Section 5, it is important to remember that these are conditional on 
the population characteristics being as of 2007.  
 
3 Counterfactual indexation 
In this section, we discuss the counterfactual indexation α used to adjust the policy parameters with 
monetary values for the differences in nominal levels over time and against which the actual changes 
to the parameters are assessed. We derive results for three scenarios, where α equals either growth 
in average market incomes, or change in CPI or 1; though in section 5 will mostly focus on the 
findings based on the first two.15  
In the first indexation scenario, benefit levels and tax thresholds are indexed relative to average 
market incomes and we will refer to this as the Market Income Index (MII). This means that families 
on benefits and those with earnings are treated in the same way, and the aggregate share of income 
which is taxed away or added as benefits remains broadly constant (though the same is unlikely to 
hold for a given household as their market income can exceed or remain below the average growth 
rate).16 Hence, the degree of redistribution would remain unchanged.17 When there is real growth in 
household market incomes, families on benefits gain in real terms because they can afford to buy 
more goods. When nominal growth in average market incomes is less than the increase in CPI, 
families on benefits lose out in real terms because they can buy less.  
With CPI indexation, benefit levels and tax thresholds follow the change in prices and families on 
benefits can afford to buy the same basket of goods over time. When there is real market income 
growth, families on benefits lose out relative to families with earnings. Families with earnings pay 
more taxes in real terms, because tax brackets grow at a lower rate than market incomes. Overall, 
tax revenues grow at a higher rate than benefit expenditures and the public finance position 
improves. When market incomes are falling in real terms, families on benefits gain relative to families 
with earnings. Families with earnings pay less tax in real terms because tax brackets grow at a higher 
rate than market incomes. Overall, the public finance position deteriorates.  
                                                          
14
 The term              is a counterfactual for which we apply the 2011 tax-benefit rules in combination with 
the 2007 policy parameters. There are cases in which a certain benefit or tax component   existed only in 2011 
and so we cannot borrow its 2007 counterpart. Such changes are considered as structural changes and have no 
indexation effect. The same applies for the term                   . 
15
 In principle, α can be also a vector. For example, a counterfactual scenario could be based on the statutory 
indexation rules as in Avram et al. (2013) which aimed to distinguish fiscal consolidation measures from 
“business as usual”. The effect being measured in this case captures government actions such as changes to the 
indexation rules or ad-hoc increases/reductions in the levels of benefits and tax thresholds. We do not consider 
this approach here as we are interested in all policy effects, including those from statutory indexation to 
measure fiscal drag and benefit erosion.  
16
 Again, this holds for tax-benefit systems which are approximately linearly homogenous (though not 
necessarily linear). 
17
 BC argue for basing α on the growth of average market incomes between two periods as this yields a 
‘distributionally neutral’ benchmark as illustrated in Callan et al. (2007). Clark and Leicester (2004) use as an 
index growth in nominal GDP and argue that it is a ’constant progressivity’ index. 
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In the third indexation scenario, with α equal to 1, we compare the nominal levels of benefits and tax 
thresholds in the two periods. Though this is clearly a less realistic policy choice for the long run, this 
scenario is of interest because in some countries there is no statutory indexation of policy 
parameters in place and income changes measured simply in nominal terms provides additional 
context for results based on CPI and MII indexation. Our simulations compare what would happen if 
there were no changes in benefit levels and tax thresholds with the effect of the actual changes that 
took place.  
We adopt each of these assumptions in turn and examine the effect of policy changes over the 
period 2001-2011 relative to growth in average market incomes, in real terms and in nominal terms. 
The changes that we capture include actual indexation practice, which may conform or not to one of 
the indexation assumptions, together with reforms to the structure of tax-benefit systems or 
individual taxes and benefits. Due to the very different movements in prices and incomes in the 
countries considered over this period, as shown in Table 1, the assumption about what index to use 
in constructing the counterfactual can make a critical difference to the conclusions that are drawn 
about the policy effect.  
 
Table 1: Counterfactual indices for 2001-07 and 2007-11 
Country 
MII CPI 
2001-07 2007-11 Total 2001-07 2007-11 Total 
Belgium 1.162 1.07 1.243 1.122 1.112 1.247 
Bulgaria 1.849 1.584 2.929 1.195 1.223 1.461 
Estonia 2.039 1.152 2.349 1.252 1.193 1.494 
Greece 1.425 0.989 1.409 1.220 1.141 1.391 
Hungary 1.673 1.129 1.889 1.369 1.205 1.65 
Italy 1.161 1.039 1.206 1.150 1.084 1.247 
UK 1.258 1.083 1.362 1.114 1.104 1.229 
Sources: MII is calculated using the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD to derive the change in 
average market income. The 2007 values are taken from the input dataset (see Table 2) and the 2001 and 2011 
values are obtained by updating (or backdating) 2007 incomes with separate factors by income source 
reflecting their average growth.
 
The same CPI index which is used internally in EUROMOD is also used as the 
basis of the counterfactual indexation, for consistency.
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4 EUROMOD and data  
We use the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD to assess household disposable income 
under the different policy scenarios. EUROMOD simulates direct personal tax and social insurance 
contribution liabilities and cash benefit entitlements for all EU member states based on the national 
tax-benefit policy rules for a given year and information available in the input micro-data (see 
Sutherland and Figari 2013). The model makes use of micro-data from nationally representative 
samples of households from the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and 
Family Resources Survey (FRS) for the UK (see Table 2). The data contain detailed information on 
individual and household characteristics as well as income by source. It is important to note that our 
                                                          
18
 See EUROMOD Country Reports for more information on market income updating and the specific CPI 
sources.  
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simulations are based on 2007 market incomes and population characteristics. Thus, any changes to 
the demographic structure and socio-economic characteristics of the population such as education 
level, household structure and employment are not captured in the analysis. 
Some policy instruments are not possible to simulate due to lack of information in the data. These 
include most contributory benefits and pensions (due to the lack of information on previous 
employment and contribution history) and disability benefits (because of the need to know the 
nature and severity of the disability, which is also not present in the data). In the case of non-
simulated benefits (e.g. public pensions), we approximate 2011 (2001) policies with updating 
(backdating) entitlements observed for 2007 with a factor reflecting the growth in the average 
entitlement.19 In this case, it is not possible to separate structural effects, and all changes in non-
simulated benefits are shown as indexation effects. 
 
Table 2: Data description 
Country Input dataset 
Income reference 
period 
Number of 
households 
Number of 
individuals 
Belgium (BE) EU-SILC 2008 2007 (annual) 6,300 15,072 
Bulgaria (BG) 
EU-SILC and National 
SILC variables 2008 
2007 (annual) 4,339 12,148 
Estonia (EE) National SILC 2008 2007 (annual) 4,744 12,999 
Greece (EL) National SILC 2008 2007 (annual) 6,504 16,814 
Hungary (HU) EU-SILC 2008 2007 (annual) 8,818 22,335 
Italy (IT) National SILC 2008 2007 (annual) 20,928 52,135 
United Kingdom (UK) FRS 2008/9 2008/9 (monthly) 25,088 57,276 
 
The tax-benefit system   is not only a function of market incomes and population characteristics but 
also certain expenditures such as housing costs. As we focus on the static effect of policy reforms, 
abstracting from individual behavioural responses, expenditures are considered exogenous, similar 
to market incomes. Hence, expenditures are kept constant in all counterfactual scenarios at their 
2007 level. 
In this analysis, we make adjustments for tax evasion and for the non take-up of benefits in cases 
where we have evidence that these are sizeable phenomena. Adjustments for tax evasion are made 
for Bulgaria, Greece and Italy, exploiting the available evidence in each case.20 We adjust for the non 
take-up of means-tested benefits and tax credits in the UK based on official statistics.21 In each case 
the adjustments are the same or equivalent in each of the policy scenarios, so we abstract from any 
change in the extent of evasion or non take-up due to changes in policy systems or other factors. We 
                                                          
19
 See EUROMOD Country Reports for more information: https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/resources-
for-euromod-users/country-reports  
20
 In Bulgaria taxes are assumed to be evaded on incomes calculated as the difference between formal earnings 
on which contributions are paid, and earnings as reported, at the individual level. On this basis evasion occurs 
at all income levels but is greater proportionally at higher incomes. In Greece adjustments are made on the 
basis of external macro estimates of income under-reporting to the authorities, by source. All recipients of each 
income source are assumed to evade by the same proportion. In Italy a similar approach is used, just for self-
employment income.  
21
 A take-up probability for each benefit and tax credit by claimant group is estimated on a caseload basis (using 
statistics from the Department of Work and Pensions and HM Revenue and Customs).  
 12 ImPRovE Discussion paper No. 14/03 
expect that estimates that assumed full compliance would be amplified to some extent, compared 
with those shown in the paper, and also that there would be a degree of re-ranking in the baseline 
income distribution, especially in the case of benefit non take-up. By definition, those not taking up 
entitlements to income-tested benefits are located towards the bottom of the income distribution.  
 
5 Results 
In this section we estimate the extent to which the seven countries on which we focus implemented 
policies that contributed to reducing or increasing poverty and inequality both in the period of 
general economic growth between 2001 and 2007, and then again in the crisis period from 2007 to 
2011. As explained above, the results from EUROMOD isolate the direct effects of changing policies 
on the income distribution, by simulating what the distributions of net incomes would have looked 
like in 2007 if instead of the actual 2007 tax and transfer systems, alternative ones based on those 
from 2001 and 2011 had been in place (indexing monetary parameters). Our results therefore 
abstract from all the other things that led to changes in the income distribution over the period 
(including changes in the socio-economic and demographic composition of the population and 
behavioural reactions to policy changes), allowing us to concentrate on the direct effects of changes 
in government policy. Throughout we focus on estimates based on the counterfactuals scenarios 
involving indexation by market incomes (MII) and according to prices (CPI), see section 3, as these 
represents more realistic choices in the long run compared to no indexation at all. The counterfactual 
scenario without indexation is only used to illustrate the size of policy effect in nominal terms. 
We start with explaining our findings for income poverty and inequality which is our main focus in 
this paper. We then present detailed results on changes in disposable income across the income 
distribution and by age group and household type. Disposable income is defined as the sum of gross 
market income and cash benefits, net of direct taxes and social insurance contributions. Throughout 
it is adjusted for differences in household size and composition using the modified OECD equivalence 
scale. The poverty rate is measured as the percentage of the population with household income 
below 60% of the median. We use two indicators: the poverty rate measured against a threshold that 
is fixed, using the median based on 2007 policies (“anchored poverty”) and the poverty rate 
measured against a threshold that changes according to the median under the policy scenario that is 
used (“floating poverty”).  ncome ine uality is measured using the Gini coefficient. 
 
5.1 Effects of policy reform on poverty 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 summarise the effects of changing policy in the seven countries in two ways. 
Figure 1 shows how the poverty rates would have changed against an anchored poverty line (i.e. 
fixed at the 2007 level) over the two sub-periods and over the ten years as a whole comparing the 
2001 and 2011 systems, with all their parameters adjusted in turn by MII and CPI against the 2007 
system, and with each system applied to the market income distribution in 2007. Figure 2 shows the 
effects of policy on poverty measured against a floating poverty line which moves with changes in 
policies. As with Figure 1, the comparison is with the 2001 and 2011 systems, adjusting all their 
parameters in turn with market income and price inflation, against the 2007 system. The change in 
the poverty rate is measured in percentage points. A positive change indicates an increase in 
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poverty, while negative change shows a drop in poverty. Table 3 provides the numbers behind Figure 
1 and Figure 2 and also shows how the floating poverty line changes with the policy system.  
 
Table 3: Poverty thresholds and poverty rates 
  
Poverty line 
 
Poverty 
rate  
Anchored 
poverty rate  
Floating 
poverty rate 
Policy system: 2001 2007 2011 
 
2007 
 
2001 2011 
 
2001 2011 
Country  MII indexation 
Belgium 
 
858 887 899 
 
11.6 
 
12.4 8.8 
 
11.1 9.5 
Bulgaria  
 
220 215 207 
 
21.1 
 
21.2 23.6 
 
22.2 22.3 
Estonia 
 
4,196 4,312 4,329 
 
19.5 
 
23.0 17.7 
 
21.5 17.9 
Greece 
 
589 556 530 
 
20.0 
 
17.8 21.6 
 
20.2 19.6 
Hungary 
 
50,316 51,697 53,619 
 
12.9 
 
11.8 12.0 
 
10.7 13.6 
Italy 
 
798 774 771 
 
17.8 
 
17.7 18.0 
 
19.0 17.8 
UK 
 
695 660 675 
 
16.8 
 
17.6 15.4 
 
19.8 16.3 
 
CPI indexation 
Belgium 
 
842 887 880 
 
11.6 
 
13.7 10.3 
 
11.5 9.9 
Bulgaria  
 
193 215 227 
 
21.1 
 
30.7 17.0 
 
26.4 19.7 
Estonia 
 
3,796 4,312 4,281 
 
19.5 
 
30.4 19.0 
 
26.4 18.7 
Greece 
 
562 556 504 
 
20.0 
 
20.3 23.7 
 
20.6 19.9 
Hungary 
 
45,231 51,697 51,858 
 
12.9 
 
19.2 13.6 
 
11.9 13.8 
Italy 
 
794 774 755 
 
17.8 
 
17.9 19.2 
 
19.1 18.0 
UK 
 
668 660 669 
 
16.8 
 
20.4 16.0 
 
20.8 16.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are adjusted to the 2007 levels using MII or CPI. Poverty line is 60% of 
median equivalised household income, shown in monthly terms and in the national currency. Anchored 
poverty is measured using 60% of median equivalised household income in 2007 as the poverty line. Floating 
poverty is measured using 60% of median equivalised household income under each scenario as the poverty 
line. 
 
As a rule of thumb, the higher the counterfactual indexation factor (i.e. alpha) for a given country, 
the less the anchored poverty rate is shown to decrease as a result of policy changes. This is because 
a higher alpha will bring indexed policy parameters, and hence counterfactual disposable incomes, 
closer to the 2007 levels (see equation 6 in section 2), thus requiring larger policy changes to achieve 
reductions in the anchored poverty rate. (Intuitively, any government action is less generous the 
higher the expectations about indexation.) This holds for all seven countries, both in the first period 
(2001-07) where MII exceeded CPI for all countries as well as in the second period (2007-11) where 
market incomes increased in real terms only in Bulgaria (see Table 1). This is also the case for the 
floating poverty line, although the effect is less pronounced due to the shifts in the poverty line.  
 
5.1.1 Policy and anchored poverty rates 
It is striking how varied the experiences of the seven countries were, both over the ten years as a 
whole and over the separate periods (see Figure 1). Measured against an anchored poverty line and 
compared to a MII-indexed counterfactual, policy reforms over the last decade had poverty-reducing 
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effects in Belgium (4 percentage points), Estonia (5 pp) and the United Kingdom (2 pp). In 
comparison with a price-indexed counterfactual scenario, policy changes have greatly reduced the 
risk of poverty in five out of the seven countries, the most in Bulgaria (14 percentage points) and 
Estonia (11 pp) and Hungary (6 pp), and in each case with the greatest effects between 2001-07. 
With economic growth, it was easier for these countries to increase the values of cash benefits that 
are received by those on low incomes more rapidly than price inflation and even than growth in 
market incomes, for instance, or to reduce taxes for those with low incomes. Those changes meant 
that poverty measured against an anchored line was lower than it would otherwise have been. In 
contrast, in Italy and Greece, compared to both 2001 MII and CPI indexed counterfactuals, poverty 
measured with an anchored line was higher or unchanged with 2011 policies.  
We further divide the reforms into two parts – those due to structural reforms (such as changes in 
percentage rates of tax) and those due to ways in which the uprating of benefits and tax brackets 
differed from the overall rate of price inflation. With the exception of Italy, the ‘indexation effect’ 
shown in Figure 3 was poverty reducing in all countries and in both periods meaning that monetary 
parameters affecting those on low incomes were on the whole adjusted ahead of price inflation. 
However, structural policy changes increased poverty in Greece and Hungary in the first period and 
also increased poverty or had a neutral effect in all countries in the second period. These effects of 
structural policy changes are very similar with counterfactual indexation by MII (Figure 4), as 
indexation assumptions matter primarily for the ‘indexation effect’ component.22 The poverty-
reducing effect of indexation effects when using MII indexation of the counterfactual tends to be 
smaller or negative (increases in poverty), than when using CPI (Figure 3). In the second period, when 
in some countries CPI grew faster than MII (see Table 1), the use of the MII to index the 
counterfactual leads to the indexation effect being more strongly poverty-reducing. This applies in 
Greece indicating that the actual indexation of policies affecting those at risk of poverty was greater 
(or less negative) than the change in market incomes.  
 
5.1.2 Policy and floating poverty rates 
But if the focus is on floating poverty rates, the story of what happened in each country is rather 
different, taking the benchmark as being one where 2001 tax and benefit systems were adjusted in 
line either with price inflation or market income growth (see Figure 2). In this case it is only Hungary 
that emerges as having policies that meant that poverty was much higher than it would have been 
against the 2001 system indexed in line with MII or CPI – by 3 and 2 percentage points respectively, 
meaning that policy changes served to increase incomes at the median more than at the bottom of 
the distribution.  
The extent to which policy changes had an impact on median incomes is what drives the differences 
between Figure 1 and Figure 2. Focussing on the first period and the changes relative to MII, using a 
floating poverty line reduces the poverty-reduction effect of policies (relative to using the anchored 
line as shown in Figure 1) in Belgium and Estonia as well as Hungary. This is consistent with policy 
changes having a greater positive (or less negative) effect on incomes at the median than on incomes 
at the bottom of the distribution. The reverse is the case in other countries where policy changes in 
this period favoured the bottom of the income distribution relative to the middle. In the second 
                                                          
22
 See corresponding terms in equation 4 (and 5) in section 2. 
 A lost decade? Decomposing the effect of 2001-11 tax-benefit policy changes on the income distribution in EU countries 15 
period the positions reverse for Estonia and UK (in opposite directions) with the poverty-reduction 
effect being smaller using the floating poverty line than the anchored line in the UK and larger in 
Estonia. It is also larger in Greece and Bulgaria, as in the first period.  
There are similar effects when comparing the CPI-indexed results in Figure 1 and Figure 2, although 
the patterns across countries are not the same. However, it seems that regardless of the indexation 
assumption the early period policy changes favoured those at risk of poverty over those at the 
median in Greece and Italy. They were less beneficial to the poor than those with middle incomes in 
Hungary in both periods, in Belgium and Estonia in the first period and in the UK in the second.  
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the policy effect decomposed into that due to structural change and 
indexation effects. The findings remain broadly consistent with the results for anchored poverty. 
Exceptions indicate where policy changes have had a particularly large differential effect on incomes 
at the median (which determine the floating poverty line) and incomes of those in or close to poverty 
levels. For example, comparing Figure 3 and Figure 5 (which use CPI indexation as the counterfactual) 
shows that for Greece structural changes 2001-07 served to increase anchored poverty but reduce 
floating poverty. This is consistent with the changes affecting both incomes at the median and 
incomes at the bottom, but with a larger effect at the bottom. The opposite can be seen for Belgium 
(with CPI) and Estonia (with MII) in the early period. 
 
5.1.3 Floating poverty reduction and the effect on the public finances 
In understanding the effectiveness of policy, the scale of the impact it achieves on poverty may be 
related to the overall cost to public finances. If a country is reducing the net yield from its tax and 
transfer system, and so households as a whole are gaining, it may be easier to be reducing poverty at 
the same time. By contrast, if changes are generating net revenue and contributing to an 
improvement in the public finances, achieving a poverty-reducing effect at the same time may be 
harder.  
The scale of the reductions in poverty using a floating line due to policy changes, shown in Figure 2 
can be compared with the average net effects of policy on all households in the two periods shown in 
Figure 7. Here, we focus on the comparisons using the MII indexation counterfactual as these are 
most relevant for considering the fiscal effect. The diamonds in the diagram show to what extent tax 
and transfer systems in 2001-11 contributed to the average net gain or loss for households, and the 
bars show the overall net effect split into the two periods, 2001-07 and 2007-11. 
What is most striking in this comparison is how much households in Greece lost on average over the 
decade compared to the 2001 system uprated in line with market incomes – by around 6 per cent in 
the first period and 5 per cent in the second period. But this contribution to public finances was 
accompanied by a small poverty-reducing effect (Figure 2). In other words, while the tax and transfer 
system was changed in ways that helped the public finances, at a net cost to households as a whole, 
this was done without the changes contributing to greater poverty when measured against a floating 
poverty line. 
Households as a whole were also net losers between 2001 and 2007 from policy change in Bulgaria, 
Italy and the UK. In Bulgaria, this had a poverty-increasing effect; in Italy and the UK the balance of 
reforms had a poverty reducing effect. The Estonian case in this period was different, with a gain to 
households as a whole – and so a net fiscal cost – accompanying the poverty-reducing effect of 
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policy. In Belgium in this period there was also a gain to households as a whole but the policy 
changes had a small poverty-increasing effect. In Hungary there was a negligible change in aggregate 
household income but a large increase in poverty. In the period 2007-11 there was a big gain on 
average for all households in Hungary but a small poverty-increasing effect of policy. 
One immediate lesson from this is that there have been periods when some governments reformed 
their tax and transfer systems in ways that generated net revenue by comparison with un-reformed 
(but income-adjusted) systems, but carried out those reforms in a way that had a poverty-reducing 
effect, or at least a neutral one. In some other countries although policy reforms resulted in gains in 
average household income, they left the bottom end of the distribution worse off compared to the 
median income. 
 
5.2 Inequality effects of policy reforms 
Looking more generally at effects on inequality overall, Figure 8 and Table 4 show whether policy 
changes tended to increase or to reduce overall inequality in disposable incomes, as measured by the 
Gini coefficient, relative to what would have happened with market income indexation or price 
indexation of the 2001 system. Using the first of these comparisons, the effects of policy changes on 
overall inequality were fairly neutral between 2001 and 2007 in five of the countries. But, as shown 
in Figure 9, which distinguishes the impacts of structural changes and indexation effects, in Italy and 
the UK, structural policy reforms implied a Gini coefficient that was more than 1 percentage point 
lower than it would have been, though this was partly offset by the indexation effect increasing 
inequality.  
The effects on inequality were much more varied due to policy changes introduced in the second 
period – with a substantial contribution to higher inequality in both Bulgaria and Hungary (2 pp), but 
contributions to lower inequality in Belgium, Estonia, Greece and the UK. It is notable that in the 
2007-11 period, structural reforms tended to increase inequality, with especially large effect in 
Hungary, but indexation had inequality-reducing effects (Figure 9). Overall, policy changes in the 
whole period served to increase the Gini in Hungary and Bulgaria (2 percentage points), and lowered 
it in the remaining countries (between 0.5-1.5 pp).  
If we compare the policy reforms in the first period to a counterfactual 2001 price-indexed system, 
the results, as might be expected, show much greater inequality reduction for the 2007 system 
(Figure 10). We find that policy had an inequality reducing effect in all countries with especially large 
impact in Bulgaria and Estonia. In the second period, 2007-11, policy changes had much smaller 
effect on reducing inequality. In fact, in Italy and especially in Hungary the 2011 tax-benefit system 
was more conducive to inequality than the 2007 system. Over the whole decade, policy changes 
reduced the Gini in all countries except for Hungary where structural changes in the second period 
had large inequality increasing effect. 
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Table 4: Inequality levels measured by Gini coefficient 
Country 
 
Gini coefficient % 
  
2001 2007 2011 
 
2001 2007 2011 
  
MII indexation 
 
CPI indexation 
Belgium 
 
22.7 22.9 22.1 
 
23.0 22.9 22.4 
Bulgaria  
 
34.8 35.2 36.9 
 
38.9 35.2 34.6 
Estonia 
 
31.2 30.8 30.1 
 
35.5 30.8 30.5 
Greece 
 
33.3 33.3 32.6 
 
33.6 33.3 33.1 
Hungary 
 
24.9 25.0 27.2 
 
26.2 25.0 27.6 
Italy 
 
32.0 30.7 30.9 
 
32.0 30.7 31.1 
UK 
 
33.8 33.2 32.5 
 
34.8 33.2 32.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD version F6.36. Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are 
adjusted to the 2007 levels using MII or CPI. Gini coefficient is measured based on equivalised household 
disposable income. 
 
5.3 Distributional effects by income group 
A more detailed view of the factors driving this can be seen in Figure 11 and Figure 12 showing the 
impact of policy changes on successive tenths of the income distribution ordered by disposable 
incomes in 2007. The first shows the impact of changes between 2001-07, and the second 2007-11.  
In these figures, as well as the effects of policy changes relative to MII and CPI indexation we also 
show the effects assuming that the counterfactual policies were constant in nominal terms. Looked 
at this way we can say that policy changes increased household incomes across the income 
distribution in all countries in the first period, except top income decile groups in Italy and the UK 
(see the green dotted line in Figure 11). Apart from Greece and Hungary with relatively flat profiles, 
the changes were also proportionally larger for lower income groups. Results based on the CPI 
counterfactual indexation (the blue dashed line) show, however, that policy changes were not 
everywhere sufficient to keep up with price increases, and even less so with changes in market 
incomes (the black line), with a positive effect present for all income groups only in Estonia. With CPI 
and MII indexation, the profiles are also flatter and even regressive for Belgium, Bulgaria and 
Hungary. 
In the second period (Figure 12), the effects in nominal terms were still positive though to a lesser 
extent, except in Greece which was the only country of the seven considered here where policy 
changes reduced nominal incomes. The effects were broadly progressive in six countries and with a 
U-shape in Hungary. As in the earlier period, policy changes could not match the price increases in 
some countries, but unlike in the earlier period, the MII-based scenario now shows a less distinct 
picture compared to CPI-based scenario in all countries but Bulgaria, due to falling real market 
incomes. In comparison with the market income indexed counterfactual, the effects in Greece were 
even marginally better than in nominal terms. Overall, the differences between indexation scenarios 
are much more marked for lower income groups, especially in Bulgaria, Estonia and the UK. Under 
the comparison using MII indexation the overall picture is broadly progressive in Belgium, Estonia, 
Greece (except for the bottom decile group) and the UK, U-shaped in Hungary and flat in Italy.  
These results use a particular ranking of households which is the same in each scenario – that using 
2007 policies. We might expect the shape of the distributional effects to be different if an alternative 
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income measure were used for ranking. Figure 29 and Figure 30 in Appendix 3 show the results 
across the income distribution, as in Figure 11 and Figure 12, but using household incomes from the 
2001 and 2011 policy scenarios (respectively, and in each case using indexation assumption-specific 
values) to rank households. The comparisons suggest that while the different rankings do indeed 
alter the pictures to some extent especially at the bottom of the distributions, the story that they tell 
is broadly the same.  
 
5.3.1 Indexation effects 
We further distinguish between the structural effect and indexation effect, focusing on the 
comparison with market income-based indexation (see Figure 13 and Figure 14). The level and 
incidence across the income distribution of the indexation effect is of particular interest because it 
allows us to assess the distributional effect of fiscal drag (in relation to taxes) together with the 
e uivalent phenomenon for cash benefits, termed “benefit erosion”. If the indexation effect is 
negative then this reflects fiscal drag/benefit erosion, meaning that governments are systematically 
raising more taxes or paying less in benefits (in relative terms) than would occur if the policy 
parameters kept pace with incomes. If the indexation effect is positive, then tax thresholds and 
benefits have been increased ahead of incomes (or prices, as in Figure 15 and Figure 16). Since 
stylised versions of the phenomena have been shown to be regressive in effect (Sutherland et al., 
2008), the distributional effects of any actual fiscal drag or benefit erosion is of particular interest.  
Figure 13 shows mixed evidence for the period 2001-07: indeed regressive effects from not indexing 
to market incomes in Bulgaria, Greece and the UK, though the effect is relatively flat in Belgium and 
Italy. The indexation effect was even beneficial to households in Estonia (in the bottom decile 
groups) and Hungary, and in the latter also progressive in its pattern. (Figure 14) the indexation 
effect is negative and also regressive only in Bulgaria. In the remainder of the countries (except Italy 
where there is negligible effect) indexation brings gains to households, progressively across the 
income distribution, except in Hungary where they are larger for households with higher income.  
In interpreting the generally rather positive influence of indexation effects on income distribution it 
is important to remember that they include the effects of both regular statutory indexation and 
occasional ad hoc increases to payment levels and tax thresholds. It is also important to note that, in 
the second period market incomes were falling in real terms in all of the countries considered, except 
Bulgaria. Nevertheless, as Figure 16 shows, even when measured against prices indexation generally 
had a positive effect on incomes that was progressive across the income distribution, except in 
Hungary and Italy.  
 
5.3.2 Structural changes and indexation effects 
The incidence of indexation effects across the income distribution may be mitigated or re-inforced by 
the effects of structural policy changes. We consider this by looking at the countries in turn and 
mainly base our discussion around the effects using the market income indexed counterfactuals (see 
Figure 13 and Figure 14). Equivalent analysis using the CPI indexed counterfactual is shown in Figure 
15 and Figure 16. 
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In Belgium, losses in the first decile group and slightly regressive gains in other decile groups were 
the result of structural changes in 2001-07 as the indexation effect was only minor. This resulted in a 
small increase in poverty and inequality (measured against MII indexation). The outcome was clearly 
the opposite in the second period, where structural changes were negligible and the indexation 
effect brought proportionally larger gains for the bottom of the distribution resulting in the largest 
poverty reduction among the seven countries and a substantial reduction in inequality.  
In Bulgaria between 2001 and 2007 policy changes, particularly indexation that lagged behind 
income growth (the long-dash line), meant the greatest proportionate reduction for the bottom two 
groups, only partly offset by structural reforms (the short-dash line). This accounted for the 
inequality-increasing effect shown in Figure 8, although interestingly the more detailed effects on 
particular groups (particularly the elderly) meant that this did not lead to a rising poverty count (see 
the final part of this section). The balance of policy between 2007 and 2011 was more severely 
regressive (due to introduction of flat income tax), with gains for the top income group alongside a 
loss equivalent to 10 per cent of income for the bottom one, and smaller losses for successive tenths 
of the distribution. Over this period, floating poverty was higher as a result of the reforms. 
In Estonia between 2001-2007 all income groups gained from structural reforms (somewhat more at 
the top), but the most notable factor contributing to reducing both poverty and inequality was more 
generous indexation benefiting the second, third and fourth income groups. A similar pattern 
followed in the second period, during which structural reforms slightly reduced net incomes across 
the distribution, but indexation benefited the bottom. More detailed analysis (see in the next 
subsection) shows that it was in particular the indexation of public pensions above the rate of 
income growth that was the main factor behind this. 
In Greece structural reforms in the first period meant larger losses higher up the distribution, but 
indexation which fell behind income growth resulted in larger losses lower down. The combined 
effect was roughly proportional, with a neutral effect on inequality and a small downward effect on 
poverty (measured with the floating poverty line) that we saw above. In 2007-11 the effects of 
structural reform were sharply regressive, with larger losses for the bottom two tenths, but 
indexation ahead of income growth (or, rather, not matching income declines) was of more benefit 
to the bottom. This drove the overall inequality-reducing and poverty reducing effects. A major 
factor in the later period were tax increases, but accompanied by some rises in the value of both 
means-tested and non-means-tested benefits relative to other incomes. 
In Hungary the dominant component of policy change from 2001-2007 were strongly regressive 
structural reforms that meant much larger losses for those at the bottom of the income distribution 
than at the top. In particular, tax reforms that benefited higher income groups the most, partly offset 
their losses from changes in other parts of the system, including social insurance contributions. 
However gains to lower income groups from indexation moderated this effect to some extent, 
leaving an overall neutral effect on inequality but a substantial effect in raising poverty. From 2007 to 
2011 although positive, the effect on the income distribution was strongly regressive due to the 
introduction of flat income tax in 2011. As a result, as we saw before (Figures 2 and 8), inequality and 
floating poverty were increased by policy change.  
The changes in Italy from 2001-2007 had more straightforward net effects, with structural changes, 
notably from taxation, reducing incomes by most proportionately, higher up the income distribution. 
This contributed to reducing inequality overall as well as the floating poverty rate. Uniquely amongst 
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the countries and the two periods studied, there was very little change in the distributional effect of 
the tax and transfer system between 2007 and 2011, which is why the effects on inequality and 
poverty were also small. 
The position in the United Kingdom from 2001 to 2007 presents another pattern again. Overall, 
indexation behind market income growth meant losses for all income groups, and most for the 
poorest. But these were offset by structural reforms (to means-tested benefits) which benefited 
three bottom income groups in particular. This made the overall net effect progressive, reducing 
inequality and, especially, poverty. In the 2007-11 period, structural reforms (again especially to 
means-tested benefits) had regressive effects, but indexation of benefits and pensions above the 
rate of income growth had progressive effects which more than offset these, leading to a similar 
downward effect on inequality and a small poverty reducing effect. 
The outcome in the first period looks much the same with the CPI indexation (Figure 15) for Belgium 
and Italy. The profiles also remain similar in Greece and Hungary, though due to larger indexation 
effects no decile group faces substantial losses overall. However, what is rather remarkable is the 
strongly progressive pattern of gains now emerging for Bulgaria, Estonia and the UK. These are 
especially large in the first two of these countries which experienced the largest growth in real 
incomes of the seven countries considered in the period 2001-07. As pointed out above, it is 
primarily the indexation effect which depends on the choice of the counterfactual indexation. The 
results for the second period (Figure 16) are very similar to those with MII indexation with only 
Bulgaria revealing substantial differences (matching those in the first period) as the only country 
which had a substantial real income growth. The overall effect is less beneficial in other countries, 
where price increases exceeded income growth. 
Two things follow from this kind of breakdown. First, what can look like similar net effects of policy 
on inequality and poverty can result from very different patterns of change across the income 
distribution as a whole, and are often the result of structural reforms and indexation policies that act 
in opposite directions. In turn, what lies behind these changes can reflect the net effect of complex 
changes to different aspects of taxes and transfers that need to be seen together to understand the 
overall balance of policy change.  
 
5.4 Effects of policy reforms by age group 
The incidence of the effects of policy reforms by types of people is also of interest, and in particular 
whether younger people have been favoured over older people, or vice versa. Different criteria are 
often applied to transfers and taxes for pensioners from other parts of the tax and transfer systems. 
For this reason, we also look at the balance of the impacts of policy reforms by age group and by 
household type. Figure 17 (for 2001-07) and Figure 18 (for 2007-11) show the age effects using the 
market income counterfactual indexation scenarios, and Figure 19 and Figure 20, respectively, using 
the CPI-indexation. 
Note here that the age group is that of the individuals but their incomes are based on those of the 
household in which they live (adjusted for household size, and assuming equal sharing). Thus changes 
that affect, for instance, transfers for children will have an impact on the age group containing 
children and on the age groups containing their parents. Similarly, if elderly people live in a larger 
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household, changes to public pensions will be taken as affecting all household members, not just the 
pensioners themselves. 
Figure 17 shows some immediate contrasts in the first period. Here the solid line gives the combined 
net effect of structural reforms (short dashes) and the indexation effect (long dashes) relative to 
indexation of the 2001 system by market income. The countries divide into three groups. 
In Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary policies were tilted towards those aged 60 or more. In Estonia, that 
meant that the largest gains went to older people; in Hungary children and middle-aged people lost, 
but older people gained, while the effect for those over 65 was neutral in Bulgaria with everyone else 
losing out. In these countries it was growth of public pensions in excess of growth in market incomes 
that led to this. The same patterns are much more pronounced with the CPI-indexation (Figure 19), 
and now showing gains across all age groups in all three countries. 
In Belgium and Greece, and less sharply in Italy, the changes in the first period were tilted against 
older people, with no gains or larger proportionate losses for those over 60. In all three cases this 
was largely driven by the shape of structural reforms, further compounded by indexation (of public 
pensions) in Greece that fell behind income growth. In Italy, households with elderly members also 
lost through lower public pensions, while large families benefited through gains in the value of their 
non-means-tested benefits, ameliorating the losses of children and parents to some extent. Greece is 
the only country where the trend is opposite with the CPI-indexation, i.e. now the elderly gaining and 
other age groups losing out. 
In the United Kingdom the age distribution of losses from policy change was fairly neutral, although 
with somewhat smaller losses for the youngest children, helped in particular by an increase in the 
generosity of means-tested transfers (tax credits) for relatively low-income families with children. 
With the CPI-indexation, the effect has the U-shape across age groups with elderly and the youngest 
having small gains, and others experiencing small losses. 
The patterns in the second period shown in Figure 18 were again different between the countries, 
and in some cases from the pre-crisis period. 
In Estonia again and now in Belgium policy reforms were tilted towards the elderly, in both cases 
because of more favourable indexation than income growth (now negative in real terms) affecting 
public pensions received by going to households with elderly members. Reforms were largely neutral 
for people aged below 60 with MII indexation, though revealing small losses with the CPI indexation. 
In Italy and the United Kingdom reforms generated small gains for older people, while in Greece 
losses were smaller for older people than others. In Italy and the UK that reflected relative gains in 
public pensions but in Greece relative gains in means-tested benefits for households with elderly 
members, while tax changes meant larger losses for other households. With the CPI indexation, 
preferential treatment of elderly people disappears in Italy and taking even the opposite direction in 
Greece. 
In Bulgaria people of all ages lost slightly as a result of both structural reforms and indexation 
changes (based on MII), so the policy changes were largely neutral between age groups. However, 
the result is very different on the basis of price-indexation, with largest gains for elderly people 
compared to any other country. 
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But in Hungary there was a sharp reversal of the balance of reforms by age, with substantial gains for 
children and younger adults, but large losses for older people, on a scale that more than offset their 
gains in the first period. The changes over this period were dominated by tax reforms, with reduced 
taxes for non-pensioners (particularly those with higher incomes), but with some pensions brought 
into taxation.  
Overall there were striking differences by age among the countries and between the two time 
periods in the impact of policy change. Older people were favoured (or less severely affected) in 
Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary in the earlier period, and in Belgium, Estonia, Italy and the UK in the 
second period. But older people were the most adversely affected in Greece and Italy in the first 
period and – in a striking reversal – in Hungary in the second period. 
 
5.5 Features of reform in each country 
The broad impacts of the reforms in each country described above come from very varied changes 
within the separate components of their tax and transfer systems. This section describes the key 
features of those changes (for simplicity concentrating on comparisons with an income-indexed 
base), drawing on the analysis of the impact of policy reforms across each income group for the 
seven countries shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22 (for the two periods) as well as the effects by 
household type shown in Figure 23 and Figure 24. The household types are not mutually exclusive 
and include households with elderly people (aged 65+), households with children (aged under 18), 
households with one earner, households with more than one earner, large families (three or more 
children) and lone parent households. Both sets of charts break down the impacts into those due to 
changes in social insurance contributions, (direct) taxes, public pensions, non-means-tested benefits, 
and means-tested benefits. The line shows the net effect of all components (for Figure 21 and Figure 
22 matching the net effects already shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12, respectively).  
Results using the CPI indexed counterfactual are provided, but not discussed, in Figure 25 and Figure 
26 for the effects across income decile groups and in Figure 27 and Figure 28 for the effects by 
household type.  
 
5.5.1 Belgium 
The overall regressive effects of Belgium’s policy changes between 2001 and 2007 arise from large 
losses in the bottom decile group and solid gains in other decile groups. These were due to structural 
reforms reducing means-tested benefits and cutting taxes progressively (Figure 21), leading to a 
notable increase in average disposable income, while the indexation effect was only minor (Figure 
13). Policy changes in the first period were targeted to the population aged under 65, while the 
effect on the elderly was neutral on average (Figure 23). Even though anchored poverty still 
increased somewhat, median income increased more than incomes at the bottom and both the 
poverty based on the floating poverty line and inequality increased slightly as noted earlier. 
The period 2007-11 shows exactly the opposite with clearly progressive gains primarily through the 
indexation effect as now structural changes matter little. Policies now favoured the elderly very 
strongly, with public pensions kept ahead of market incomes, and apart from the relative increase of 
non means-tested benefits raising incomes for the two bottom deciles (Figure 22) and lone parent 
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families (Figure 24), there was little other change. Policies decreased inequality and especially 
poverty – more than in any other country – in the second period, as well as for the whole period. 
 
5.5.2 Bulgaria 
Similarly to Belgium, Bulgaria’s policy changes in the first period were regressive with the largest 
losses concentrated on the bottom decile group and as can be seen in Figure 21 also stemming from 
a fall in the value of means-tested benefits. This however was a result of indexation of transfers that 
fell well below income growth, only partly offset by some structural reforms to them. Figure 23 
shows that large families (with 3 or more children) were the biggest losers from these changes, while 
pensioners were comparatively protected. As we noted above, however, this was not associated with 
a large impact on poverty rates because the households affected from the first income decile group 
were already in poverty.  
The largest changes overall were losses affecting all income groups from structural changes in social 
insurance contributions (increased rates for employees23), partly offset for all income groups apart 
from the lowest by structural reforms to direct taxes (reduced tax rates).  
In the second period (Figure 22), the net effects of the policy changes were more sharply regressive. 
In 2008, Bulgaria replaced the progressive income taxation it had in place with a flat tax reform with 
no tax exemption for the poor which lead to increases in average tax rates across the whole income 
distribution with the exception of the top two income deciles. In this case, losses from means-tested 
benefits for the poorest group (due again to indexation below income growth) were combined with 
structural tax changes from which all income groups lost, apart from the top two income groups. 
Again families with children were most affected by the changes, particularly the largest families. 
Families with elderly members were relatively well protected. 
 
5.5.3 Estonia 
By contrast, Estonia’s reforms between 2001 and 2007 were (mostly) progressive. Figure 21 shows 
that this resulted from substantial benefits to the bottom half of the income distribution from 
improved public pensions (from indexation), at the same time as structural reforms to taxation (the 
flat tax rate lowered by 4 pp) that benefited the top half of the income distribution almost as much. 
Households with elderly members, unsurprisingly gained most from the pension changes, and lost 
least from higher social insurance contributions, accounting for the sharp tilt in gains towards older 
people. 
In the second period shown in Figure 22, the dominant feature was again more generous public 
pensions from indexation above the rate of income growth (which in turn lagged behind price 
increases). For higher income groups the negative effects of higher social insurance contributions 
outweighed benefits from lowering the income tax rate further, and the top half of the distribution 
lost overall. The end result was as described above: progressive changes overall, tilted towards those 
                                                          
23
 Although total social insurance contributions (SIC) paid by employees and employers fell, the ratio between 
employee and employer SIC fell from 80:20 to 65:35 in favour of the employers. As a result, employees ended 
up paying higher SICs. 
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aged over 60, and contributing both to lower inequality and lower poverty than they would 
otherwise have been. 
The main driver of the overall poverty-reducing impact over the decade as a whole – the largest 
amongst the seven countries – was therefore the way in which public pensions were indexed more 
rapidly than income growth, both before and after the crisis, but also due to the pensioners being 
more concentrated around the poverty line. In the first period there was a significant net cost of the 
reforms as a whole, equivalent to 3 per cent of household income overall. In the second period they 
had a neutral effect (compared to the 2007 system indexed to income growth). 
 
5.5.4 Greece 
In the first period, the losses across the income distribution (Figure 21) stemmed from a combination 
of structural reforms to social insurance contributions and taxes as well as indexation of public 
pensions (the latter spread remarkably equally across the income distribution) that was slower than 
income growth. The overall comparatively small effects of tax changes resulted from structural 
reforms (to the rate schedule) leading to higher taxes, offset by changes to indexation (to the size of 
the general tax allowance). The means-tested benefit for large families became universal (non-means 
tested) in 2002, which explains the drop in disposable income due to means-tested benefits offset by 
a increase in disposable income due to non means-tested benefits. The larger population coverage of 
the universal benefit moderated losses for the lowest income groups a little. 
The second period was dominated by tax changes that reduced incomes fairly evenly across the 
income distribution. The structural components of this were regressive, while the indexation effect 
(in the presence of falling average market income) offset this at the bottom, leaving a neutral effect 
overall. There were some relative gains for the bottom half of the income distribution from means-
tested benefits, non-means-tested benefits and public pensions falling less than market incomes, at 
the same time as structural reforms reduced the value of public pensions to those in higher income 
groups. Together these produced the progressive revenue-raising effect shown in Figure 12, and the 
small contribution of policy change to lower floating poverty across the ten years as a whole. 
 
5.5.5 Hungary 
As we already saw, the net effect of policy change from 2001 to 2007 in Hungary was regressive. 
Figure 21 shows this resulted from means-tested benefit losses for the bottom two income groups, 
losses from social insurance contributions across the distribution, and pension and structural tax 
reforms benefiting the top half of the distribution. Overall, the bottom tenth were 10 per cent worse 
off than they would have been with an unchanged but income-linked system, but the top half gained 
(apart from the top tenth). Larger families were the biggest net losers from the reforms, while 
households with elderly members were the biggest gainers. Overall the changes had a significant 
effect, leading to the largest increase in poverty (measured with the floating poverty line) among the 
countries in the first period. 
On the surface, the substantial changes between 2007 and 2011 were from a structural tax reform 
that brought its greatest benefits to the highest income groups and a substantial positive effect from 
public pension changes relative to market incomes (Figure 22). But the effect on average was offset 
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by certain pensions being brought into tax (Figure 24). It was the regressive nature of the tax reforms 
in the later period, combined with the reductions in the relative value of means-tested benefits for 
non-pensioners in the earlier period that meant that policy changes overall had the effect of 
increasing poverty over the decade as a whole. 
 
5.5.6 Italy 
The composition of policy change in Italy was more straightforward. Between 2001 and 2007 it was 
dominated by revenue-raising and progressive structural tax changes, with little else changing apart 
from small losses to all income groups from indexation of public pensions falling behind market 
incomes. While all household types lost, large families were somewhat protected. 
Between 2007 and 2011 there were few structural reforms, and the very limited net effect of policy 
change for all income groups was the result of public pension indexation that was more generous 
than a link to incomes and tax bracket indexation that was less generous. The top income group had 
a small net gain as a result of structural tax changes, but the scale of the effects on all groups was 
much more modest than for any of the other countries in the post-crisis period. 
 
5.5.7 United Kingdom 
Finally, Figure 21 shows that it was the increased generosity of means-tested benefits for households 
in the first three decile groups (as a result of a structural reform associated with the ‘new tax credits’ 
introduced by the Blair government) that meant the reforms overall were progressive. In other 
respects, all income groups were affected by increased taxes (from both structural and indexation 
changes) and falls in the relative value of both public pensions and non-means-tested benefits. This 
combination contributed to reducing inequality as well as poverty.  
In the post-crisis period from 2007 to 2011 shown in Figure 22, the reforms overall had a progressive 
effect, with the lowest income groups gaining most proportionately from indexation of public 
pensions and means-tested benefits that was more generous than overall income growth (partly 
offset by structural reforms including higher taper rates for tax credits which reduced their reach up 
the income distribution). At the same time, the top income group lost from the addition of a top 
income tax rate and an increase in social insurance contribution rates for higher earners. This left the 
reforms reducing inequality and contributing to a modest downward effect on poverty. 
 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we assess the direct effect of tax-benefit policy changes on the distribution of 
household disposable income, and on poverty in particular, in seven EU countries in 2001-2011. We 
further split the period into two using 2007 as the mid-point to investigate policy effects before and 
since the Great Recession. We follow the decomposition framework of Bargain and Callan (2010), 
extending it further to distinguish between structural policy reforms and how policy parameters such 
as benefit amounts and tax bracket thresholds have evolved over time (i.e. the indexation effect). 
The assessment of policy effects relies on constructing counterfactual income distributions (using the 
microsimulation method), where the choice of an appropriate indexation factor for monetary 
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parameters (to adjust the counterfactual for changes in nominal levels over time) can be – as we 
demonstrate – important for the outcome.  
Our main empirical findings are the following. The effect of policy changes on poverty (measured 
using an anchored poverty line) varied across countries with a clear poverty-reducing effect in 
Belgium, Estonia and the UK, and an unambiguous poverty-increasing effect in Greece and Italy. In 
terms of floating poverty (i.e. shifting poverty lines), policy changes had a poverty-increasing effect 
only in Hungary. In the crisis period, it was the indexation effect which contributed to poverty (as 
well as inequality) reduction in nearly all cases, meaning that monetary parameters on the whole 
were adjusted ahead of price inflation and often also relative to market incomes, since these were 
falling in real terms (except in Bulgaria). Structural changes typically the opposite effect on poverty. 
This means that countries undertook deliberate reforms to their systems rather than resorting to less 
explicit fiscal drag and benefit erosion when their public finances became under pressure. Except in 
Belgium, policies since the crisis also achieved less in terms of poverty reduction compared to the 
pre-crisis period. This is not only problematic in the sense that it implies the drawing back of safety 
nets at the time when they are needed the most, but also points towards the need to achieve more 
under favourable economic conditions in order to be better prepared for more challenging economic 
periods. On the other hand, there are periods when governments reformed their systems resulting in 
net revenue but in a way that avoided increasing poverty. Examples include Greece in both periods 
(only for poverty using a floating line) and UK in the first period. There are also examples where 
policy changes that reduced revenue also resulted in higher poverty (Hungary, using poverty with a 
floating line).  
Overall there were striking differences by age between the countries and the two time periods in the 
impact of policy change. Older people were favoured (or less severely affected) in Bulgaria, Estonia 
and Hungary in the period before 2007, and in Belgium, Estonia, Italy and the UK after 2007. But 
older people were the most adversely affected in Greece and Italy in the first period and – in a 
striking reversal – in Hungary in the second period 
There are two obvious caveats and hence also directions in which our work can be taken forward. 
First, due to limited data availability we assessed absolute policy effects conditional on 2007 (i.e. 
mid-period) market incomes and population structure. Using data from another point in time would 
not necessarily produce the same results. Indeed, in order to analyse policy effects in relative terms 
(i.e. as a proportion of total changes) as well as interactions with other changes, additional 
decompositions would need to be carried out on datasets from the start- and end-periods (i.e. 2001 
and 2011). However, the EU-SILC survey only started in 2003 (with a few countries) and achieved 
near-full EU coverage in the 2005 wave.24 Alternatively, other income surveys for 2001 could be 
considered, but in that case part of the changes in the income distribution would be also due to 
differences in the underlying survey methodology. The 2012 wave (with 2011 incomes), on the other 
hand, is under construction at the time of writing. Second, we focus on direct effects only and leave 
aside behavioural adjustments (e.g. labour supply) to policy changes. This might be an important 
omission if the policy changes introduced in the period were specifically designed to alter the 
incentive e.g. take paid work or work longer hours. An extension of the work here could attempt to 
capture these as well. 
                                                          
24
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/documents/SILC_IMPLEMENTATION_heade
zr.pdf  
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Looking across our results, what is most striking is quite how varied and complex the differences 
between countries in their use of fiscal instruments and in their effects were. For policy-making this 
illustrates the freedom of action policy-makers have, even when they are trying to achieve similar 
changes in their fiscal positions. The period from 2001 to 2011 was not a ‘lost decade’ as policy 
changes did have poverty-reducing effects in most of the countries that we examine. The caveats 
about lack of comparable poverty estimates for the period 2001-11 notwithstanding, the available 
evidence (Appendix 1) suggests that out of the seven countries, poverty has risen over the period in 
five countries and fallen only slightly in two (Estonia and UK). Only in Hungary can some of the 
observed increase in poverty be explained by government action through tax-benefit policy changes. 
In the other countries poverty would have risen by more (or fallen by less), had policies remained as 
in 2001.  
From a policy point of view there is a clear need to understand the important influence of indexation 
of policies on the outcomes in terms of poverty and inequality and relative gains and losses by social 
and demographic groups. Especially in times of economic volatility, whether policies should keep 
pace with market incomes, with prices or some other economic variable is an important issue for 
consideration and open debate. Indexation by the growth in market incomes keeps public support in 
line with changes in private incomes, and hence relative poverty using a floating threshold constant, 
though may imply that benefit levels are cut in times of economic hardship.  
Indexation of policies by changes in the price level means that public support may lag behind market 
incomes in times of growth but protects living standards in periods when real (market) incomes are 
falling, also offering greater automatic stabilisation. If short-term fiscal considerations make this 
impossible then, as our analysis shows for some countries, it is still possible to structure policy 
changes to provide relative protection for those on low incomes.  
From an analytical point of view, our detailed analysis of the nature of the policy changes reveals that 
what can look like similar net effects of policy on inequality and poverty can result from very 
different patterns of change across the income distribution as a whole, and are often the result of 
structural reforms and indexation policies that act in opposite directions. In turn, what lies behind 
these changes can reflect the net effect of complex changes to different aspects of taxes and 
transfers that need to be seen together to understand the overall balance of policy change.  
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Figures  
Figure 1: Effect of policy changes 2001-2011 on anchored poverty 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD version F6.36.  
Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are adjusted to 2007 levels using growth in market income (MII) or 
CPI; anchored poverty is measured using 60% of median equivalised household income in 2007 as the poverty 
line. Standard errors for confidence intervals are calculated using the delta method. 
Figure 2: Effect of policy changes 2001-2011 on floating poverty  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6.36.  
Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are adjusted to 2007 levels using growth in market income (MII) or 
CPI; floating poverty is measured using 60% of median equivalised household income under each scenario as 
the poverty line. Standard errors for confidence intervals are calculated using the delta method. 
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Figure 3: Effects of policy changes against a CPI-indexed counterfactual on anchored poverty: 
structural change and indexation effect, 2001-07 and 2007-11  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD version F6.36.  
Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are adjusted to the 2007 levels using CPI; anchored poverty is 
measured using 60% of median equivalised household income in 2007 as the poverty line. Standard errors for 
confidence intervals are calculated using the delta method. 
Figure 4: Effects of policy changes against a market income-indexed counterfactual on anchored 
poverty: structural change and indexation effect, 2001-07 and 2007-11  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD version F6.36.  
Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are adjusted to the 2007 levels using MII; anchored poverty is 
measured using 60% of median equivalised household income in 2007 as the poverty line. Standard errors for 
confidence intervals are calculated using the delta method. 
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Figure 5: Effects of policy changes against a CPI-indexed counterfactual on floating poverty: 
structural change and indexation effect, 2001-07 and 2007-11  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are adjusted to the 2007 levels using CPI; 60% of median equivalised 
household income used as a poverty line for floating poverty. Standard errors for confidence intervals are 
calculated using the delta method. 
Figure 6: Effects of policy changes against a market income-indexed counterfactual on floating 
poverty: structural change and indexation effect, 2001-07 and 2007-11  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are adjusted to the 2007 levels using MII; 60% of median equivalised 
household income used as a poverty line for the floating poverty. Standard errors for confidence intervals are 
calculated using the delta method. 
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Figure 7: Effect of policy changes 2001-2011 relative to MII and CPI indexation on household 
disposable income 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD version F6.36.  
Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are adjusted to the 2007 levels using market income (MII) or prices 
(CPI).  
Figure 8: Effect of policy changes relative to MII and CPI indexation on the Gini coefficient 2001-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD version F6.36.  
Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are adjusted to the 2007 levels using using market income (MII) or 
prices (CPI).  Standard errors for confidence intervals are calculated using the delta method. 
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Figure 9: Effect of policy changes relative to MII indexation on the Gini coefficient: structural 
change and indexation effect, 2001-07 and 2007-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD version F6.36.  
Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are adjusted to the 2007 levels using MII. Standard errors for 
confidence intervals are calculated using the delta method. 
Figure 10: Effect of policy changes relative to CPI indexation on the Gini coefficient: structural 
change and indexation effect, 2001-07 and 2007-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD version F6.36.  
Notes: 2001 and 2011 policy parameters are adjusted to the 2007 levels using CPI. Standard errors for 
confidence intervals are calculated using the delta method. 
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Figure 11: Effect of policy changes on average disposable income by income decile groups, 2001-07 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6. 
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2007 household equivalised disposable incomes. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
Figure 12: Effect of policy changes on average disposable income by income decile groups, 2007-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6. 
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2007 household equivalised disposable incomes. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
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Figure 13: Effect of policy changes relative to MII indexation on average disposable income by 
income decile groups: structural change and indexation effect, 2001-07 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2007 household equivalised disposable incomes. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
 
Figure 14: Effect of policy changes relative to MII indexation on average disposable income by 
income decile groups: structural change and indexation effect, 2007-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2007 household equivalised disposable incomes. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
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Figure 15: Effect of policy changes relative to CPI indexation on average disposable income by 
income decile groups: structural change and indexation effect, 2001-07 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2007 household equivalised disposable incomes. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
 
Figure 16: Effect of policy changes relative to CPI indexation on average disposable income by 
income decile groups: structural change and indexation effect, 2007-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2007 household equivalised disposable incomes. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
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Figure 17: Effect of policy changes relative to MII indexation on average disposable income by age 
groups, 2001-07 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: Individuals are grouped in 5 years-age categories based on 2007 population. The eldest group contains 
individuals aged 80+. The charts are drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of 
them is the same. 
Figure 18: Effect of policy changes relative to MII indexation on average disposable income by age 
groups, 2007-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: Individuals are grouped in 5 years-age categories based on 2007 population. The eldest group contains 
individuals aged 80+. The charts are drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of 
them is the same. 
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Figure 19: Effect of policy changes relative to CPI indexation on average disposable income by age 
groups, 2001-07 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6,  
Notes: Individuals are grouped in 5 years-age categories based on 2007 population. The eldest group contains 
individuals aged 80+. The charts are drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of 
them is the same. 
Figure 20: Effect of policy changes relative to CPI indexation on average disposable income by age 
groups, 2007-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD version F6.36.  
Notes: Individuals are grouped in 5 years-age categories based on 2007 population. The eldest group contains 
individuals aged 80+. The charts are drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of 
them is the same. 
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Figure 21: Effect of policy changes relative to MII indexation on average disposable income by 
income components and income decile groups, 2001-07 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2007 household equivalised disposable incomes. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
Figure 22: Effect of policy changes relative to MII indexation on average disposable income by 
income components and income decile groups, 2007-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2007 household equivalised disposable incomes. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
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Figure 23: Effect of policy changes relative to MII indexation on average disposable income by 
income components and household type, 2001-07 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  otes: Household types are non-exclusive and 
based on the 2007 population. All=All households; wE= hhs with elderly people (age 65+); wC=hhs with children 
(age <18); 1-E=One-earner hhs; 2-E=Two-earner hhs; LF=Large families (3+ children); LP=Lone parent hhs. The 
charts are drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
Figure 24: Effect of policy changes relative to MII indexation on average disposable income by 
income components and household type, 2007-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  otes: Household types are non-exclusive and 
based on the 2007 population. All=All households; wE= hhs with elderly people (age 65+); wC=hhs with children 
(age <18); 1-E=One-earner hhs; 2-E=Two-earner hhs; LF=Large families (3+ children); LP=Lone parent hhs. The 
charts are drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
 
-5
0
5
1
0
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Belgium
 
-1
0
-5
0
5
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Bulgaria
 
-5
0
5
1
0
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Estonia
 
-1
0
-5
0
5
1
0
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Greece
 
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
5
1
0
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Hungary
 
-1
0
-5
0
5
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Italy
 
-1
0
-5
0
5
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
UK
%
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 o
f 
2
0
0
7
 h
h
 d
is
p
o
s
a
b
le
 i
n
c
o
m
e
2007 households
 Social Insurance Contributions  Taxes  Public Pensions
 Non Means-Tested Benefits  Means-Tested Benefits  Disposable Income
 
-5
0
5
1
0
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Belgium
 
-1
0
-5
0
5
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Bulgaria
 
-5
0
5
1
0
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Estonia
 
-1
0
-5
0
5
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Greece
 
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Hungary
 
-5
0
5
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
Italy
 
-5
0
5
All wE wC1-E2-E LF LP
UK
%
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 o
f 
2
0
0
7
 h
h
 d
is
p
o
s
a
b
le
 i
n
c
o
m
e
2007 households
 Social Insurance Contributions  Taxes  Public Pensions
 Non Means-Tested Benefits  Means-Tested Benefits  Disposable Income
 42 ImPRovE Discussion paper No. 14/03 
Figure 25: Effect of policy changes relative to CPI indexation on average disposable income by 
income components and income decile groups, 2001-07 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2007 household equivalised disposable incomes. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
Figure 26: Effect of policy changes relative to CPI indexation on average disposable income by 
income components and income decile groups, 2007-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2007 household equivalised disposable incomes. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
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Figure 27: Effect of policy changes relative to CPI indexation on average disposable income by 
income components and household type, 2001-07 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  otes: Household types are non-exclusive and 
based on the 2007 population. All=All households; wE= hhs with elderly people (age 65+); wC=hhs with children 
(age <18); 1-E=One-earner hhs; 2-E=Two-earner hhs; LF=Large families (3+ children); LP=Lone parent hhs. The 
charts are drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
Figure 28: Effect of policy changes relative to CPI indexation on average disposable income by 
income components and household type, 2007-11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  otes: Household types are non-exclusive and 
based on the 2007 population. All=All households; wE= hhs with elderly people (age 65+); wC=hhs with children 
(age <18); 1-E=One-earner hhs; 2-E=Two-earner hhs; LF=Large families (3+ children); LP=Lone parent hhs. The 
charts are drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
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Appendix 1: Poverty and income inequality estimates 2001, 2007 and 2011 
Table 5 shows estimates from Eurostat sources for risk-of-poverty (using 60% of the median as the 
threshold) and the Gini coefficient for incomes in 2001, 2007 and 2011 for the countries covered by 
this study. The 2007 and 2011 estimates come from a data source that is broadly comparable across 
countries and through time: the EU-S LC. However, the “2001” estimates come from a mix of sources 
including ECHP for the EU-15 countries (referring to 2000 incomes) and Household Budget Survey 
data for the remainder. Thus these estimates are not comparable across countries. More importantly 
for the questions addressed in this paper, they are not comparable with those provided for 2007 and 
2011 incomes. Differences may be as much to do with differences in survey methodology and 
concepts as between the actual situations in the respective periods. Nevertheless, the table provides 
a broad-brush summary of the direction of movement in the two indicators in the two sub-periods. 
 
Table 5: Poverty and income inequality estimates 2001, 2007, 2011 
Source of data: Mixed EU-SILC EU-SILC   
 
income reference period Direction of movement 
 
2000/01 2007 2011 
 
2001-07 2007-11 
Poverty risk with 60% of the contemporary equivalised median as the threshold (%) 
Belgium 13 14.8 14.9 
 
up flat 
Bulgaria 16 21.3 21.2 
 
up flat 
Estonia 18 19.5 17.6 
 
up down 
Greece 20 20.1 23.1 
 
flat up 
Italy 19 18.7 19.4 
 
flat (up) 
Hungary 10 12.4 14.0 
 
up up 
United Kingdom 17 18.7 16.2 
 
up down 
Gini coefficient (%) 
     Belgium 28 27.5 26.5 
 
flat (down) 
Bulgaria 26 35.9 33.6 
 
up down 
Estonia 35 30.9 32.5 
 
down up 
Greece 33 33.4 34.3 
 
flat (up) 
Italy 29 31.0 31.9 
 
up (up) 
Hungary 23 25.2 26.9 
 
up up 
United Kingdom 31 32.6 33.0 
 
up flat 
Sources: Eurostat. 2007 and 2011 estimates are based on 2008 and 2012 EU-SILC respectively (except for UK 
which uses 2007 and 2011 SILC for the 2007 and 2011 income reference periods). 2001 estimates (some using 
2000 incomes) are from Eurostat (for EU-15) and Dennis and Guio (2004a, 2004b). 
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Appendix 2: Examples for indexation effect and structural change  
This section provides four examples for hypothetical policy changes which illustrate the difference 
between the indexation effect and the structural change (see Section 2).  
Example 1 
Assume that in period 0, country A had the following progressive income tax schedule: for incomes 
between 0 and 1,000 the tax rate was 0; between 1,000 and 1,200, it was 15%; between 1,200 and 
2,000, it was 25%; and above 2,000, it was 35%. Statutory indexation rules exist in the country, so 
that each year tax brackets are increased by 15%. In addition, in period 1 the government increased 
the tax rate for the second bracket from 15% to 17%, so that the tax rules were: for incomes 
between 0 and 1,150, the tax rate was 0; between 1,150 and 1,380, it was 17%; between 1,380 and 
2,300, it was 25%; and above 2,300, it was 35%. 
Assume that we have information on people’s characteristics and market incomes from period 1. 
Now let us assume that an individual had market income    equal to 2,400. 
Furthermore, prices grew between the two periods by 10%, so that the CPI-based counterfactual 
index      . The index is used in the counterfactual scenarios (see below) to scale up the 
monetary parameters from period 0,   , which are then applied to market incomes from period 1, 
  , and effectively shows how benefit amounts and tax brackets between the two periods have 
grown relative to prices. 
Let us calculate the change in disposable income due to the policy effect and decompose it into 
indexation effect and structural change. As we are interested in the change in individual disposable 
income, we will look at the change in        instead of the change in the summary indicator 
          and would transform equation (4) into: 
                       ⏟
 ndexation effect
                      ⏟
Structural change
 
In this example, the indexation of tax brackets is treated as the indexation effect while the change in 
the second tax bracket is a structural change. Let us now calculate the individual’s disposable income 
as in period 1 and as in the two counterfactual scenarios. 
Disposable income in period 1 is calculated by simply replacing the tax-benefit rules and the policy 
monetary parameters as they are in that period: 
                                                               
                            
Next, in the first counterfactual scenario, we keep the tax-benefit rules as of period 1 but replace the 
monetary parameters of that period (tax brackets) with their counterparts from period 0, indexed by 
price inflation:  
                                                                   
                                    
In the last counterfactual scenario, we also replace the tax-benefit rules from period 1 with those 
from period 0: 
                                                                   
                                  
 46 ImPRovE Discussion paper No. 14/03 
We can finally calculate the change in disposable income due to the policy effect. 
  
                 ⏟  
 ndexation effect
              ⏟  
Structural change
     ⏟
 ndexation effect
     ⏟
Structural change
      
The policy effect is positive (18.9), i.e. disposable income has increased between the two periods due 
to policy changes. In other words, the individual was better off in period 1 than in period 0.  
Example 2 
Now let us consider another example. In period 0, country B had the same progressive income tax 
schedule as country A in period 0. In period 1, however, the government decided to revise the tax 
schedule and make it less progressive: for incomes between 0 and 1,200 the tax rate was 0; between 
1,200 and 2,000, it was 15%; between 2,000 and 3,000, it was 25%; and above 3,000, it was 35%. 
Assume an individual in period 1 with income    equal to 2,400 and price inflation between the two 
periods equal to 10%, so that the counterfactual index      . 
In this example, the change of tax brackets is not an indexation effect but a structural change. Thus, 
the indexation effect is non-existent and in            we will simply replace     with   . 
                                                               
                   
                                                                    
                                  
  
             ⏟
 ndexation effect
            ⏟
Structural change
  ⏟
 ndexation effect
    ⏟
Structural change
     
The policy effect in country B is 103 (with zero indexation effect), much larger than it would have 
been in country A for the same individual.  
Example 3 
Now let us return to our first example and assume that in addition to the changes in tax brackets and 
the second marginal tax rate, the government in country A decided to introduce in period 1 a new 
basic income benefit equal to 200. Let us now assume that in addition to the progressive income 
taxation, country B already had a basic income scheme in period 0, with the benefit amount equal to 
200. In period 1, the government did not do any benefit adjustments for price inflation or incomes 
growth and kept the benefit level nominally the same. The calculations for country A and country B 
policy are now as follows: 
In period 1, in addition to subtracting the tax liability of the individual gross income, we have to add 
to it the basic income benefit: 
                                                               
                                
As a next step, we want to calculate the individual’s disposable income by keeping the tax-benefit 
rules as of period 1 but using the monetary policy parameters from period 0, indexed by price 
inflation. Note that the basic income scheme did not exist in period 0, i.e.    is non-existent, and so, 
we will simply add to the net income the benefit as it is in period 1: 
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In the last counterfactual, disposable income is calculated based on the tax-benefit rules and 
monetary parameters, indexed by price inflation, in period 0: 
                                                                   
                                  
Finally, the policy effect is: 
  
                 ⏟  
 ndexation effect
              ⏟  
Structural change
     ⏟
 ndexation effect
      ⏟
Structural change
       
As the introduction of the new benefit altered the tax-benefit rules, we treated it as structural policy 
change. The indexation effect remained the same as in the first example; however, the structural 
change became larger and positive. 
Example 4 
For country B, as in country A in period 1, in addition to subtracting the tax liability of the individual 
gross income, we have to add to it the basic income benefit: 
                                                                
           
In contrast to country A, the basic income did exist in period 0 in country B, i.e.    equals 200: 
                                                                   
           
                                                                    
                                          
The policy effect in country B is: 
  
             ⏟
 ndexation effect
            ⏟
Structural change
    ⏟
 ndexation effect
    ⏟
Structural change
    
The effect of keeping the level of the basic income nominally constant appeared in the indexation 
effect. The government’s did not adjust the benefit amount over time which translated into negative 
change in disposable income (with respect to price changes). 
Although an individual with the same market income in both countries would have had higher 
disposable income in both periods in country B, we find that the positive policy effect in country A 
was around 3 times larger than in country B. 
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Appendix 3: Alternative ranking of households  
 
Figure 29: Effect of policy changes 2001-2011 on disposable income by income decile groups with 
households ranked using 2001 counterfactual income 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD version F6.36.  
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2001 counterfactual household equivalised disposable incomes. 
The figure shows the % change in average equivalised household disposable income in 2007. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. 
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Figure 30: Effect of policy changes 2001-2011 on disposable income by income decile groups with 
households ranked using 2011 counterfactual income 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUR M D version F6. 6.  
Notes: Income deciles are derived based on 2011 counterfactual household equivalised disposable incomes. 
The figure shows the % change in average equivalised household disposable income in 2007. The charts are 
drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same.  
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ImPRovE: Poverty Reduction in Europe.  
Social Policy and Innovation 
 
Poverty Reduction in Europe: Social Policy and Innovation (ImPRovE) is an international 
research project that brings together ten outstanding research institutes and a broad 
network of researchers in a concerted effort to study poverty, social policy and social 
innovation in Europe. The ImPRovE project aims to improve the basis for evidence-based 
policy making in Europe, both in the short and in the long term. In the short term, this is 
done by carrying out research that is directly relevant for policymakers. At the same 
time however, ImPRovE invests in improving the long-term capacity for evidence-based 
policy making by upgrading the available research infrastructure, by combining both 
applied and fundamental research, and by optimising the information flow of research 
results to relevant policy makers and the civil society at large. 
The two central questions driving the ImPRovE project are: 
 How can social cohesion be achieved in Europe? 
 How can social innovation complement, reinforce and modify macro-level policies 
and vice versa? 
The project runs from March 2012 till February 2016 and receives EU research support 
to the amount of Euro 2.7 million under the 7th Framework Programme. The output of 
ImPRovE will include over 55 research papers, about 16 policy briefs and at least 3 
scientific books. The ImPRovE Consortium will organise two international conferences 
(Spring 2014 and Winter 2015). In addition, ImPRovE will develop a new database of 
local projects of social innovation in Europe, cross-national comparable reference 
budgets for 6 countries (Belgium, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Spain) and will 
strongly expand the available policy scenarios in the European microsimulation model 
EUROMOD. 
 
More detailed information is available on the website http://improve-research.eu.  
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